126 [The original is: "propter principii commendationem," which the English translator renders "On account of commending to our thoughts the principle [of the Godhead]." The technical use of "principium" is missed. Augustin says that the phrases, "sending the Son," and "sending the Spirit," have reference to the "visible creature" through which in the theophanies each was manifested; but still more, to the fact that the Father is the "beginning" of the Son, and the Father and Son are the "beginning" of the Spirit. This fact of a "beginning," or emanation (manatio) of one from another, is what is commended to our thoughts.-W.G.T.S.]
9 The terms "unbegotten" and "begotten" are interchangeable with the terms Father and Son. This follows from the relation of a substantive to its adjective. In whatever sense a substantive is employed, in the same sense must the adjective formed from it be employed. Consequently, if the first person of the Trinity may be called Father in a sense that implies deity, he may be called Unbegotten in the same sense. And if the second person may be called Son in a sense implying deity, he may be called Begotten in the same sense. The Ancient church often employed the adjective, and spoke of God the Unbegotten and God the Begotten (Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 25, 53; ii. 12, 13. Clem. Alex. Stromata v. xii.). This phraseology sounds strange to the Modern church, yet the latter really says the same thing when it speaks of God the Father, and God the Son.-W.G.T.S.]
16 [This phraseology appears in the analytical statements of the so-called (cap. 11-16), and affords ground for the opinion that this symbol is a Western one, originating in the school of Augustin.-W.G.T.S.].
18 [It is remarkable that Augustin, understanding thoroughly the distinction between essence and person, should not have known the difference between ou0sia and upo/stoaij. It would seem. as if his only moderate acquaintance with the Greek language would have been more than compensated by his profound trinitarian knowledge.
In respect to the term "substantia"-when it was discriminated from "essentia," as it is here by Augustin-it corresponds to u/po/stasij, of which it is the translation. In this case, God is one essence in three substances. But when "substantia" was identified with "essentia," then to say that God is one essence in three substances would be a self-contradiction. The identification of the two terms led subsequently to the coinage, in the mediaeval Latin, of the term "subsistantia," to denote u9po/stasij.-W.G.T.S.]
25 [The reason which Augustin here assigns, why the name Holy Spirit is given to the third person-namely, because spirituality is a characteristic of both the Father and Son, from both of whom he proceeds-is not that assigned in the more developed trinitarianism. The explanation in this latter is, that the third person is denominated the Spirit because of the peculiar manner in which the divine essence is communicated to him-namely, by spiration or out-breathing: spiritus quia spiratus. This is supported by the etymological signification of pneu=ma, which is breath; and by the symbolical action of Christ in John xx. 22, which suggests the eternal spiration, or out-breathing of the third person. The third trinitarian person is no more spiritual, in the sense of immaterial, than the first and second persons, and if the term "Spirit" is to be taken in this the ordinary signification, the "trinitarian relation," or personal peculiarity, as Augustin remarks, "is not itself apparent in this name;" because it would mention nothing distinctive of the third person, and not belonging to the first and second. But taken technically to denote the spiration or out-breathing by the Father and Son, the trinitarian peculiarity is apparent in the name.
And the epithet "Holy" is similarly explained. The third person is the Holy Spirit, not because he is any more holy than the first and second, but because he is the source and author of holiness in all created spirits. This is eminently and officially his work. In this way also, the epithet "Holy"-which in its ordinary use would specify nothing peculiar to the third person,-mentions a characteristic that differentiates him from the Father and Son.-W.G.T.S.]
26 2 Cor. v. 5, and Eph. i. 14.
35 [The term "beginning" (principium), when referring to the relation of the Trinity, or of any person of the Trinity, to the creature, denotes creative energy, whereby a new substance is originated from nothing. This is the reference in chapter 13. But when the term refers to the relations of the persons of the Trinity to each other, it denotes only a modifying energy, whereby an existing uncreated substance is communicated by generation and spiration. This is the reference in chapter 14.
When it is said that the Father is the "beginning" of the Son, and the Father and Son are the "beginning" of the Spirit, it is not meant that the substance of the Son is created ex nihilo by the Father, and the substance of the Spirit is created by the Father and Son, but only that the Son by eternal generation receives from the Father the one uncreated and undivided substance of the Godhead, and the Spirit by eternal spiration receives the same numerical substance from the Father and Son. The term "beginning" relates not to the essence, but to the personal peculiarity. Sonship originates in fatherhood; but deity is unoriginated. The Son as the second person "begins" from the Father, because the Father communicates the essence to him. His sonship, not his deity or godhood, "begins" from the Father. And the same holds true of the term "beginning" as applied to the Holy Spirit. The "procession" of the Holy Spirit "begins" by spiration from the Father and Son, but not his deity or godhood.-W.G.T.S.].
36 ["Matter" denotes the material as created ex nihilo: "nature" the material as formed into individuals. In this reference, Augustin speaks of "the nature of the soul" of the people of Israel as existing while "as yet that people existed not" individually- having in mind their race-existence in Adam.-W.G. T.S.]